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ABSTRACT
Scholars have long speculated about education’s political impacts, variously arguing that it promotes
modern or pro-democratic attitudes; that it instills acceptance of existing authority; and that it empowers
the disadvantaged to challenge authority. To avoid endogeneity bias, if schooling requires some willingness
to accept authority, we assess the political and social impacts of a randomized girls’ merit scholarship
incentive program in Kenya that raised test scores and secondary schooling. We find little evidence
for modernization theory. Consistent with the empowerment view, young women in program schools
were less likely to accept domestic violence. Moreover, the program increased objective political knowledge,
and reduced acceptance of political authority. However, this rejection of the status quo did not translate
into greater perceived political efficacy, community participation, or voting intentions. Instead, the
perceived legitimacy of political violence increased. Reverse causality may help account for the view
that education instills greater acceptance of authority.
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Education policies have often been motivated by views on their political impacts. Several U.S. 
states historically restricted the education of slaves for fear that it would encourage revolt 
(Woodson 1915), and Belgian colonial authorities in Africa enacted similarly restrictive 
education policies (Hochschild 1999). Post-independence authorities in Africa expanded 
education with a goal of promoting national identity and integration (Nyerere 1973), as it had 
earlier been used in Europe (Weber 1976).  The view that expanding girls’ educational access is 
a key to speeding the rise of female politicians and women’s empowerment was a factor in the 
adoption of the third United Nations Millennium Development Goal (Herz and Sperling 2004; 
Levine et al. 2008, Lloyd 2009). Girls’ scholarship programs in particular have been used to 
move towards this goal. Officials in Bangladesh cite women’s empowerment as a main objective 
of their scholarship program (Rynor and Wesson 2006; Khandker et al 2003). There are also 
large programs in Egypt (Save the Children 2005, Iqbal and Riad 2004), Cambodia, Pakistan and 
India (Filmer and Schady 2008; Chaudhury and Parajuli 2006; India edunews.net 2010). 
   This paper exploits a randomized merit scholarship competition for adolescent girls in 
Kenyan schools to estimate the political and social impacts of these programs and shed light on 
education’s impact more generally. Other research demonstrated that the incentives created by 
the program led to higher academic test scores (Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton 2009). In the 
current paper we analyze data from a follow-up survey collected four to five years after the 
scholarship competition, when the young women were 17 to 21 years of age. 
Less developed regions have experienced massive increases in both education and 
democracy over the past half century, as illustrated by Kenya (appendix figure A1), and there has 
been extensive debate on how these trends might be interrelated. A widespread claim is that the 2 
 
recent democratic transitions in North Africa and the Middle East – the world’s least democratic 
region, together with sub-Saharan Africa – have been propelled by increasingly well-educated 
youth populations, notably including young women (Saunders 2011). Scholars have long 
speculated about education’s political impacts. Modernization theorists argued that education 
weakens traditional ascriptive attachments based on gender, hereditary position, ethnicity and 
religion, in favor of merit (Levy 1966).  Lipset (1959) argues that education promotes 
democratization. Dahl (1971) similarly asserts that socioeconomic development increases the 
potential for successful democracy, as a literate populace engages in the types of participation 
necessary to maintain representative government, and Huntington (1991) claims education 
contributed to the “Third Wave of Democratization” in the 1970s and 1980s. The modernization 
view has been influential, from post-colonial leaders seeking to use education as a nation 
building tool, to journalists arguing that it weakens support for violent extremism (Kristof 2010), 
to contemporary scholars studying the relationship between education and democracy (see 
Acemoglu et al. 2005, 2008, Barro and Lee 2001, Boix and Stokes 2003, Boix 2009, Epstein et 
al. 2006, Papaioannou and Siourounis 2005, Przeworski and Limongi 1997, among others). 
Another view argues that education serves as a tool of cultural indoctrination and social 
control, instilling obedience to authority (Lott 1999, Pritchett 2003, Kremer and Sarychev 2008). 
Bowles and Gintis (1976) claim that U.S. education reinforces the class structure by training 
citizens to obey authority within the hierarchical modern corporation. Gramsci (1971) and other 
social theorists (Freire 1972, Fanon 2005) advance related points on its central role in bolstering 
the cultural hegemony of ruling elites, while simultaneously emphasizing that alternative forms 
education could be instruments for social change favoring the “liberation” of the oppressed. 3 
 
A third school of thought views education as promoting individual autonomy and 
empowerment.  In observational studies, education is correlated with greater individual political 
knowledge (Almond and Verba 1963, Verba and Nie 1972, Hanushek 2002, Bratton et al. 2005, 
Mattes and Bratton 2007); interest in obtaining political information (Dee 2004); greater 
dissatisfaction with existing institutions, and more support for women’s rights (Weakliem 
2002).
1  While correlations have been documented between education and political interest, 
participation and voting among individuals in wealthy countries (Verba and Nie 1972, Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone 1980, Inglehart et al 1998, Weakliem 2002, Dee 2004, Milligan et al 2004, 
Glaeser et al 2007), Galston (2001) notes that historical increases in U.S. education have not 
been followed by higher aggregate voter turnout or political knowledge. Moreover, the evidence 
in less developed countries is mixed. While Logan and Bratton (2006) find a positive correlation 
between education and political participation using AfroBarometer data from 15 countries, 
Blaydes (2006) finds a negative association between voting and education in Egypt, and argues 
that this result is due primarily to vote-buying. Education is seen as politically empowering for 
women in particular. Basu and King (2001) find that educated Bangladeshi women are more 
likely to participate in political meetings and to speak up. 
Political empowerment need not be benign. Davies’ (1974) “J-curve theory” posits that 
rapid expansions in opportunities build up expectations which, if unmet, can lead to frustration 
and violence. This theory was used to explain the relatively high schooling levels among 
participants in U.S. urban social unrest during the 1960s and 1970s (Miller et al 1977, Mason 
and Murtagh 1985). Krueger and Maleckova (2003) find that education predicts greater 
participation in Hezbollah activities in Lebanon. 
                                                 
1 Lochner (2011) and Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011) survey this literature. 4 
 
A major difficulty in estimating the impact of education on individual attitudes and 
behavior is the possibility of reverse causality.  For example, if those who are less willing to 
accept authority are less likely to stay in school, cross-sectional correlations between education 
and acceptance of authority will confound the causal impact of education on willingness to 
accept authority with the impact of acceptance of authority on education.  Most existing studies 
estimate correlations between education, attitudes and behaviors in ways that are potentially 
vulnerable to this critique.
2 One strategy for addressing this problem, which we adopt in this 
paper, is to exploit randomized variation in education to separately measure the impact of such 
education on acceptance of authority. The use of experimental designs in comparative politics is 
growing (e.g., Wantchekon 2003, Humphreys et al 2006, Gugerty and Kremer 2008, Paluck and 
Green 2009, Habyarimana et al 2009, Olken, 2010, Vicente and Wantchekon 2010). A limitation 
of this micro-experimental approach is that we measure the impact of education induced by a 
particular policy in a single population Yet insofar as similar policies oriented at boosting girls’ 
education have been widely advocated and implemented in low-income countries, creating 
evidence on the impact of these programs is itself an important objective and can complement 
existing non-experimental analyses.  
This paper takes advantage of the experimental Girls Scholarship Program (GSP) in 
Kenyan primary schools, which persistently boosted academic test scores and increased 
secondary school enrollment among girls from treatment schools.
3  We find that exposure to the 
program reduces young women’s acceptance of the right of men to beat their wives and children 
                                                 
2 There are exceptions. Exploiting compulsory schooling laws, Milligan et al (2004) find impacts on political 
knowledge and voting in the U.S., with weaker effects in the U.K.  Dee (2004) uses variation in community college 
availability and child labor laws in the U.S., and finds that education leads to higher voter turnout. Smith et al. 
(2009) use school supply variation to show that education increases autonomy over spousal choice for Vietnamese 
women. 
3 In another study, Jakiela et al (2010) exploit the random assignment of the GSP program to estimate the impact of 
education on respect for earned property rights using lab experiment data.   5 
 
and there is evidence it reduces the likelihood that parents are involved in choosing their 
daughter’s spouse. These findings are broadly consistent with both modernization theory as well 
as the view that education promotes a desire for autonomy and empowerment, but are harder to 
reconcile with the claim that education tends to reinforce existing patterns of authority. 
The evidence on attitudes beyond the household is not consistent with a modernization 
perspective but is more readily explained by the empowerment view of education. In particular, 
there is no evidence that the human capital created by the GSP leads to more pro-democratic or 
secular attitudes, or weakened ethnic identification. In fact, there is suggestive evidence that 
ethnic identity grows stronger among program beneficiaries, despite the Kenyan school 
curriculum’s stated aim of promoting feelings of national unity. 
Consistent with the view that education leads to a greater desire for autonomy, GSP 
participants are more likely to read newspapers and better able to identify a favorite news source. 
They possess more objective knowledge about politics and express less satisfaction with Kenya’s 
democracy and current economic conditions. However, these impacts do not translate into 
greater perceived political efficacy or involvement as measured by voting intentions or 
participation in community groups. Instead, the young women express greater willingness to 
accept the legitimacy of the use of violence in politics. The increased acceptance of violence may 
not be surprising given the limited scope for our study participants to affect change in Kenya’s 
fledgling democracy; their greater dissatisfaction with, but no greater participation in (or belief 
in) democracy; and the finding that ethnic identification does not diminish with education. It also 
resonates with the fact that violence has been a central feature of political change in Kenya, from 
the anti-colonial Mau Mau uprising in the 1950s to the contested 2007 presidential election. 6 
 
Going back to the theoretical perspectives outlined above, our findings appear equally 
inconsistent with the view that education promotes “modern” attitudes and with the claim that 
education instills acceptance of existing authorities. Rather the results suggest that education 
promotes a desire for personal autonomy among the marginalized young rural women that we 
study, but that this desire is not necessarily expressed through democratic means.  In the political 
realm we see evidence of greater knowledge and raised expectations, but not of actual political 
involvement, and perhaps as a result, we document greater frustration and acceptance of political 
violence. This suggests that while young women may be less willing to accept violence directed 
against them by others, this does not stem from an abstract rejection of violence, and that indeed 
they may be more willing to accept political violence as necessary in some circumstances.  
Methodologically, it is useful to know whether a non-experimental analysis would yield 
similar results. We find large differences between experimental IV estimates derived from the 
randomized design and non-experimental correlations, suggesting that non-experimental 
correlations cannot be interpreted as causal impacts of education.  Under a simple model of bi-
directional causality, our findings can be interpreted as suggesting that those who are less willing 
to accept authority are likely to accumulate considerably less human capital in Kenya. 
To further get at the channels of impact, and in particular at whether these effects are 
directly due to receiving additional education through the merit-based scholarship competition, 
or to the money or prestige garnered by winning a scholarship itself, we examine a subset of girls 
who had very low ex ante odds of winning the scholarship based on their baseline test scores. As 
shown in Kremer et al. (2009) these girls also experience test score gains through the program. 
The main impacts on social and political variables also hold in this subsample, supporting the 
view that the effects are due to human capital gains rather than winning an award per se.  7 
 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides background on the setting; section 3 
summarizes the data and empirical methods, and program impacts on human capital; section 4 
reports results on household autonomy; Section 5 reports political attitude impacts; Section 6 
develops a framework for analyzing the interaction between the willingness to accept authority 
and education, and compares experimental to non-experimental estimates; Section 7 examines 
channels of impact, and the final section concludes. 
 
2. Background 
2.1 The Study Setting 
The Kenyan girls in the setting we study are socially marginalized and politically disempowered. 
They are female and young in a society where older males hold authority; residents of a rural 
backwater; and overwhelmingly from the quite politically weak Luhya and Teso ethnic groups. 
Women are also disadvantaged in Kenyan society more broadly. Female participation in 
parliament is low, at just 10% (Gathigah 2010). Spousal violence is also widespread, with 75% 
of women claiming abuse in recent reports (FIDA 2008). In the household realm, Kenyan girls 
are generally subject to their parents’ – and in particular their father’s – authority until they leave 
the household, and then are often subject to their husband’s authority. Traditionally, parents 
played a central role in selecting husbands for their daughters and received bridewealth from the 
groom in the form of livestock (Government of Kenya 1986). However, while this system 
remains normative in some sense, in practice it has largely broken down in favor of a system in 
which young people “elope” with partners of their choice, and bridewealth is either never paid or 
is paid later (if the groom accumulates sufficient resources). In rural areas, unmarried women, 
unlike men, are not permitted to build their own separate house on a family compound and are 8 
 
thus more directly subject to parental authority. Many young women therefore marry at an early 
age, at least in part to escape parental control. 
Our study area is Busia, a district in western Kenya with below average income levels.
4  
Ethnic Luhyas comprise roughly 80% of the sample, with some Luos and Tesos (Table 1).  
Although Luhyas are among Kenya’s most numerous groups, Luhya politicians have been 
unsuccessful in the competition for the presidency. Kenya’s first President was Jomo Kenyatta, 
from the Kikuyu ethnic group, its second (Daniel arap Moi) was a Kalenjin, and the third, Mwai 
Kibaki, a Kikuyu. There is a widespread perception in Busia that these presidents’ ethnic groups 
wielded disproportionate power during their rule, to the detriment of western Kenya. 
Like many African countries, Kenya became a de facto single-party state shortly after 
independence in the 1960s and underwent democratic reforms in the early 1990s at the end of the 
Cold War (Barkan 1994). The Kenyan African National Union retained power until 2002, when 
a multi-ethnic coalition led by Mwai Kibaki defeated Moi’s handpicked candidate. When Kibaki 
in 2005 proposed a new constitution seen as preserving a strong “imperial” presidency and 
favoring Kikuyu elites, voters overwhelmingly rejected it, including voters in our study area. 
Thus during 2005-2007 when our survey data collection took place, Kenya had an imperfect but 
reasonably competitive multi-party democracy. This is reflected in its Freedom House score of 3 
during the period (on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being most democratic, appendix figure A1).  
Yet the fragility of this democracy was starkly demonstrated in late 2007 and early 2008 
(after the end of surveying). The incumbent was widely seen as having stolen the presidential 
election (Gibson and Long 2009). Individuals living in the study area overwhelmingly supported 
                                                 
4 62% of Busia households fall below the poverty line compared to 41% nationally.  As Kenyan per capita income is 
somewhat higher than the sub-Saharan African average (if South Africa is excluded), the fact that Busia is 
somewhat poorer than the Kenyan average arguably makes the district more representative of rural Africa as a 
whole. 9 
 
the challenger Raila Odinga. Protests against the incumbent’s declaration of victory became 
violent, ethnic clashes broke out across the country, and some observers believed Kenya was on 
the verge of civil war. Due to a combination of internal and external pressure, the incumbent 
eventually acceded to a power-sharing agreement with the challenger.  
Since independence from Britain in 1963, Kenya has experienced massive increases in 
education, with adult literacy rising from just 32% in 1970 to 87% today (UNDP 1993, 2010). 
Although there are, huge gender disparities in other areas of Kenyan society, census data indicate 
that girls’ enrollment has increased at a faster rate than boys’ at lower levels of education 
(appendix figure A1), and there is now gender parity in primary school enrollment (UNDP 
2009). Kenya’s increase in education is dramatic, but many other low-income countries have 
also seen similar gains. To illustrate, in 1960 the average working-age person in low-income 
countries had 1.8 years of education, while by 2000 they had over five (Barro and Lee 2001).  
As background, the Kenyan school system is quite authoritarian. Corporal punishment is 
commonplace (Human Rights Watch 1999), and challenges to teacher authority are not tolerated. 
Student prefects help teachers maintain classroom control, students wear uniforms, learning is by 
rote, and creativity and critical thinking in the classroom are not highly prized. It is unlikely that 
Kenyan schools would be viewed as instruments of liberation in the sense of Freire (1972). 
Despite this emphasis on discipline and rote learning, the Kenyan school curriculum 
officially attempts to promote democratic values, and a national Kenyan - as opposed to ethnic - 
identity.
5 For example, two chapters of “History and Government”, a first year (Form 1) high 
school text approved by the Ministry of Education, are entitled “Citizenship” and “National 
Integration”. It states: “Citizens have the responsibility of participating in the democratic process 
through which our leaders are elected.” Under “Elements of Good Citizenship” it lists 
                                                 
5 We focus on Form 1 since the GSP increased secondary school participation, as shown below. 10 
 
nationalism, explaining, “a nationalist works for one’s country and devotes oneself to serving the 
nation and the unity of his/her nation. Thus a Kenyan nationalist is devoted to Kenya and seeks 
to unite fellow countrymen above interests of race, tribe, religion or parochialism.”  
Primary school in Kenya runs through grade 8, after which students take a national exam 
and those with sufficiently high scores continue on to secondary school.  Historically, attending 
secondary school has been associated with higher social status, since secondary schools are 
selective, much more expensive than primary school, and many are boarding institutions.  
 
2.2 The Girls Scholarship Program (GSP) 
In March 2001, ICS, a Dutch non-profit organization, introduced a merit scholarship competition 
in 34 primary schools in the western Kenya district of Busia, with 35 other schools serving as the 
control group. This Girls Scholarship Program (GSP) provided an award to grade 6 girls in 
treatment schools whose performance on the government’s standardized end-of-year exam 
placed them in the top 15% (among all girls in the treatment schools). The award included a 
grant of 500 KSh (or roughly US$6.40 at the time) paid to the girl’s school to cover school fees, 
and a cash grant of 1000 KSh (or US$12.80) paid to the girl’s family to pay for other school 
expenses, in each of the two years following the competition, covering the last two years of 
primary school. Thus the total award for winners was valued at nearly US$38 over two years, an 
amount comparable to the large-scale girls’ scholarship programs in other less developed 
countries mentioned above.  For comparison, Kenya’s annual per capita income was roughly 
US$400 in 2001. The awards were presented at local community assemblies.
6 
                                                 
6 Although primary school fees were eliminated in 2003, certain expenses remained, and Duflo et al. (2006) and 
Evans et al. (2010) find that these remained an important barrier to participation. 11 
 
The randomization into treatment and control schools was carried out using a computer 
random number generator, after first stratifying by administrative division and participation in a 
previous NGO program (that distributed flip-charts as classroom learning aids) also carried out 
by ICS. All 34 schools invited to participate chose to take part in the project. GSP treatment and 
control schools in Busia are similar on observable baseline characteristics (Table 1, Panel A), 
indicating that the randomization worked in generating similar groups; the first column in Table 
1 presents the mean (and s.d.) in the control group, and the second column presents the 
coefficient estimate on the treatment indictor variable. The NGO did not conduct other activities 
at these schools during the study so we can attribute impacts to the GSP. There was a parallel 
evaluation in neighboring Teso district that is discussed in Kremer et al (2009). However, since 
the Teso sample was far smaller, had considerable attrition during the original study, and did not 
experience an obvious increase inhuman capital as a result of the program, the follow-up surveys 
were only conducted in Busia district and we thus focus on the Busia program in this paper. 
  The Kenyan school year runs on the calendar year, from January to December (Appendix 
figure A2). The program was publicly announced early in 2001. The competition was carried out 
a second time in treatment schools in 2002 among students in grade 6 in that year (and eligibility 
was restricted to those girls who had been initially enrolled in grade 5 in the same schools in 
2001, to eliminate the possibility of selective transfers into treatment schools). There were thus 
two cohorts in the program, those in grade 6 in 2001 and those in grade 6 in 2002. 
  The average 2001-2002 treatment effect of GSP incentives in Busia district was nearly 
0.3 standard deviations, and the 2001-2002 estimated effect in our follow-up subsample was 0.34 
standard deviations (Table 1, Panel B; Kremer et al 2009)
7. These are considered large gains in 
                                                 
7 The effect size in the follow-up sample is similar to that in the original sample, but it is slightly less statistically 
significant in the follow-up sample because of the reduced sample size. 12 
 
the education literature.  As is standard, test scores are normalized such that the control group 
distribution has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one
8. Importantly, the program 
generated higher test scores in treatment schools both for those who were most likely to benefit 
from the scholarship – girls with high baseline scores – but also for those who were unlikely to 
win, and the hypothesis that treatment effects were the same throughout the baseline test score 
distribution cannot be rejected. The explanation for the gains among low-performing girls 
offered in Kremer et al. (2009) is that the incentives led to improved teacher performance and 
student effort that generated positive classroom externalities (including for boys, who also show 
moderate gains despite being ineligible for the scholarship). This is supported by the substantial 
increases in both pupil and teacher attendance in treatment schools (Table 1, Panel B). 
 
3. Data Collection, Estimation Strategy, and Program Impact on Human Capital 
3.1 Follow-up Data Collection (2005-2007) 
To assess the persistence of these academic gains and other long-term impacts of the program, a 
follow-up survey was undertaken from October 2005 through February 2007, approximately four 
to five years after the GSP competitions, when sample individuals were young women between 
17 and 21 years of age. This involved tracking down the two cohorts of girls from both treatment 
and control schools. Because the original intervention was aimed at girls, and the research budget 
was limited, the follow-up data collection sample was limited to females. 
Respondents were followed by the survey team wherever they moved in Kenya or 
Uganda using an approach similar to Baird et al. (2011).  Overall, 84.0% of respondents were 
effectively located by the field team, with 81.6% surveyed while 2.4% were either deceased, 
                                                 
8 While it is also possible to normalize separately within cohorts, here we normalized the entire sample together, and 
include cohort controls in all regressions, to simplify the exposition. 13 
 
refused to participate, or were found but were unable to be surveyed (Table 2, Panel A).
9 The 
effective survey rate among those still alive is 81.6%. These are quite high rates for a mobile 
young adult population, and one that places this project among the more successful longitudinal 
survey efforts in a low-income country (Thomas et al, 2001, 2010). The final analysis sample 
with baseline survey data, 2001 or 2002 test scores, and follow-up data includes 1,387 girls. 
There are no statistically significant differences in follow-up survey attrition across the 
treatment and control groups (Table 2, Panel A).  We also do not find that survey attrition over 
time is significantly related to the baseline 2000 test score, the presence of a toilet, iron roof, or 
mosquito net in the home compound, time spent on chores and schoolwork, schooling attitudes, 
and number of siblings, nor are these characteristics significant predictors of survey attrition 
when interacted with the treatment indicator (not shown), evidence that differential survey 
attrition across the treatment and control groups does not appear to be a leading concern. As with 
the baseline survey data, the follow-up subsample is balanced along observed baseline individual 
and household characteristics across the treatment versus control samples (Table 1, Panel A). 
Once respondents were located, enumerators administered short tests on English 
vocabulary, Swahili vocabulary, arithmetic, reading, and spatial reasoning (using a Raven’s 
matrix module). The survey also included questions on schooling, marriage, fertility, migration, 
and social and political attitudes. To the extent possible, these latter questions were adapted from 
questions in the World Values Survey and Afrobarometer Surveys, building on Bratton et al. 
(2005), Logan and Bratton (2006), and Weakliem (2002), while some new questions were 
                                                 
9 During an initial phase, all individuals were tracked. In early 2007, a random subsample containing one fifth of the 
remaining unfound respondents was drawn to be tracked “intensively” (in time and travel costs). We re-weight the 
“intensive” sample to maintain representativeness. As a result, all figures are “effective” tracking rates (ETR), 
calculated as a fraction of those found, or not found but searched for during intensive tracking, with appropriate 
weights. The ETR is a function of the regular phase tracking rate (RTR) and intensive tracking rate (ITR), ETR = 
RTR + (1 – RTR)*ITR, where RTR is 47.5% and ITR is 65.2%. This is related to the approach in the U.S. Moving 
to Opportunity study (Kling et al. 2007, Orr et al. 2003).  14 
 
developed specifically for the Kenyan context. In the tables, we denote questions drawn from the 
World Value Survey with “WVS” and Afrobarometer with “AFB”. Indicator variables are 
denoted “0-1”. Questions asked on a four- or five-point scale were rescaled so the lowest 
(highest) answer takes on a value of zero (one), and these are denoted “0 to 1” in the tables. 
 
3.2 Estimation Strategy 
We first estimate the impact of the Girls Scholarship Program on outcomes (POLIT) in a reduced 
form specification, by regressing POLIT on the indicator variable for GSP treatment schools 
(TREAT). We also include some additional control variables (denoted X) – an indicator for 
student cohort, age at time of the survey, the mean pre-program (2000) school test score, parent 
educational attainment, and month of the survey – to address any minor baseline differences 
between the treatment and controls schools that exist despite the randomization. Since the 
randomization successfully produced treatment and control groups balanced along most 
characteristics (Table 1), the inclusion of controls does not meaningfully alter treatment effect 
estimates but sometimes improve statistical precision. Equation 1 presents the reduced form: 
(eqn. 1)     POLITis =  +  TREATs + Xis + is 
where individual i is in school s. The coefficient of interest is . Disturbance terms are clustered 
by school. We employ OLS for both continuous and limited dependent variables in part to 
facilitate the use of the mean effects approach (described below), but results for indicator 
variable outcomes are nearly unchanged in probit specifications (not shown). 
The GSP program could potentially affect political attitudes through human capital or 
through other impacts of winning a scholarship, such as the cash transfers and public recognition 
received by winners. Recall that girls in the top 15% in the treatment schools won scholarships.  15 
 
We find that girls with normalized baseline test scores less than +2 standard deviations have just 
an 8% chance of winning the scholarship, as compared to a 58% likelihood among girls with 
baseline scores above +2 s.d.
10 These treatment school girls with low baseline scores are thus 
unlikely to receive the prize and recognition, but as shown in Kremer et al (2009), they 
nonetheless attended school more often and have test score gains. As we discuss in section 6 
below, estimating treatment effects in this subgroup sheds light on the relative importance of the 
“public recognition” and “human capital” channels, suggesting that the human capital channel is 
much more important.  
To convey a sense of the magnitude of the human capital effects, and to allow 
comparison of our experimental estimates with non-experimental estimates, we report IV 
estimates of the impact of human capital on political attitudes by using the follow-up test score 
measure as the endogenous variable, denoted H. We view the test score as an attractive summary 
measure of human capital. We focus on the normalized average test score across all subjects 
(arithmetic, English, Swahili, reading, spatial reasoning) as our best measure of overall skills and 
human capital, where the normalized variable is mean zero with a standard deviation of one (the 
common approach in the education literature). The first stage equation is: 
(eqn. 2)    His = a1 + b1TREATs + Xisc1 + e1,is . 
The predicted values from this regression allow us to estimate human capital impacts in an 
instrumental variable two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) specification, where the second stage is: 
(eqn. 3)     POLITis = a2 + b2His + Xisc2 + e2,is  . 
For comparison with observational studies, we also provide similar estimates but running the 
second stage equation (equation 3) using the actual test score rather than the predicted score, 
                                                 
10 Approximately 2% score more than 2 s.d. above the mean of the normalized distribution. 16 
 
while restricting attention to the control group to isolate non-experimental variation. For each set 
of outcomes, we then compare the analogous OLS and IV coefficient estimates, and compute the 
statistical significance of the difference between them using the method in Hausman (1978).  
  For various categories of outcomes, we estimate the “mean effect” of either GSP 
treatment or human capital on each set of outcomes following Kling et al. (2007). The groupings 
of related outcome variables are denoted by Yk, k = 1, ..., K.  We standardize each outcome by 
subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of the outcome variable among the 
GSP control group, such that the control group mean (s.d.) is zero (one). The standardized 
variables are denoted Yk
*.  With these, we form Y
* = k Yk
* / K, a single index of outcomes, and 
regress this index on TREAT (as in equation 1) or on H (equation 3). The resulting coefficient 
estimate is called the mean effect size and, due to the normalization, it captures the average 
impact in terms of standard deviations of the outcome variables. This normalization facilitates 
comparison of impact magnitudes across outcomes, as well as possibly across studies. 
 
3.3 Impacts on Human Capital 
We first discuss the program’s impact on human capital. The human capital gains that occurred 
as girls competed for scholarships persisted, with significant test score gains in treatment schools 
relative to the control group (Table 2, Panel B). In specifications analogous to the first stage 
regression (equation 2), test scores improved in all five subjects in the 2005-2007 follow-up 
survey, with statistically significant gains in four subjects. The mean effect across all tests is 
0.208 standard deviations (s.e. 0.092), which is significant at 95% confidence.  
  Test score impacts are nearly unchanged among two subgroups with relatively low 
chances of actually winning a GSP award, namely those with baseline normalized test scores less 17 
 
than +2 s.d., at 0.145 s.d. (s.e. 0.082), and among those in schools predicted to have five or fewer 
GSP winners, at 0.177 s.d. (s.e. 0.081). The predicted number of GSP winners is estimated in 
treatment schools by regressing the actual number of winners on quantiles of the baseline test 
score distribution (among students in that school); the predicted number of winners is then 
assigned to both treatment and control schools. The persistent human capital gains we document 
thus appear to be driven by competing for a scholarship rather than winning. 
Beyond test scores, several other education measures also improved in the treatment 
group: they were 8.7 percentage points (s.e. 4.1) more likely to have attended at least some 
secondary school, an increase of nearly a third on the control rate of 30%. GSP treatment 
individuals were also 7.9 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in school, an increase of 
15 percent relative to the control group, where 52% were enrolled. Since more than half the 
sample is still in school, the attainment data is severely censored, and perhaps in part as a result, 
the program is estimated to have a positive but not significant impact on educational attainment.  
 
4. Impact on Autonomy within the Household 
As noted in the introduction, many argue that education will empower young women to address 
broader gender inequalities (Lloyd 2009). Others have argued that women in most societies face 
relatively less disadvantage in education than other spheres, and that efforts to reduce gender 
imbalances could be more productive elsewhere (World Economic Forum 2010). Modernization 
theory would also imply that education should erode support for traditional gender roles. 
We do not find significant changes in views regarding equal rights for women versus 
traditional gender roles (Table 3). Most respondents already strongly support gender equality, 
with average support for traditional roles (namely, the statement that “Women have always been 18 
 
subject to traditional laws and customs and should remain so”, as opposed to “Women should 
have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do”) at only 0.17 on a normalized zero 
to one scale. Treatment reduces this by 0.01 but the effect is not significant. 
In contrast, treatment produces changes on two concrete issues limiting female autonomy 
that are likely to be personally relevant for many respondents: domestic violence and arranged 
marriages. Again on a zero to one scale, treatment leads to a 0.068 reduction (s.e. 0.024) in 
support for the claim that “Men can beat their wives and children if they misbehave” as opposed 
to the statement that “No one has the right to use physical violence against anyone else” (Table 
3), a reduction of roughly one quarter on average support of 0.25 in the control group.  
We next consider marriage patterns, and divide marriages into “arranged marriages”, 
where parents played a role in spouse choice, and “elopements”, where they did not. Roughly 
20% of respondents were married by the follow-up survey, with three quarters being elopements 
in the control group, and one quarter, or 4.2%, arranged. However, this latter figure falls by more 
than half, or 2.4 percentage points (s.e. 1.3) in the treatment group (Table 3), and this effect is 
significant at 90% confidence. In contrast, we find no change in the likelihood of elopement, 
suggesting that the reduction in marriages with family involvement does not reflect a broader 
trend in marriage rates but rather a shift in power from parents to their daughters.  When we use 
a mean effects approach to look at a summary measure of lack of autonomy combining the two 
measures of support for traditional gender norms with the measure of arranged marriage we find 
a significant reduction of -0.181 standard deviations (s.e. 0.077).  
There are no significant GSP program impacts on fertility, or on knowledge of 
contraception, age of marriage, or basic spouse characteristics (not shown) although statistical 
power was limited in some cases given the limited proportion of married women in the sample. 19 
 
The results on young women’s greater control over marriage patterns and stated 
opposition to domestic violence 	are relevant not only from a policy perspective but also shed 
light on the theories described in the introduction. They are inconsistent with the idea that 
education simply instills greater acceptance of authority, but are compatible with both 
modernization theory and with the view that education can empower disadvantaged groups. 
While these results are inconsistent with the simplest version of the theory that education is a 
tool for entrenching existing power structures, they are arguably consistent with a more nuanced 
view, in which Kenya’s education system is controlled not by traditional village elites, but rather 
by a state seeking to instill certain “modern” values that weaken pre-capitalist “fetters” on female 
labor.  To distinguish between these two perspectives, we next consider impacts on political and 
social attitudes beyond the household.  
 
5. Impacts on Political and Social Attitudes  
In subsection 5.1, we first find little support for a direct impact of education in promoting 
“modern” values. Subsection 5.2 reports evidence that runs counter to the view that education 
simply instills acceptance of existing authority, but is consistent with the notion that education 
promotes an awakening of political consciousness that is arguably the first step to actual 
empowerment, specifically through changes in media consumption, increased political 
knowledge and dissatisfaction with authority.  However, subsection 5.3 suggests that rather than 
translating into increased participation in politics or community affairs, or in social capital, these 
shifts generate greater expressed willingness to accept the use of violence in politics. 
 
5.1 Impact on “Modern” Attitudes 20 
 
Impact on Ethnic and Religious Attitudes 
From a theoretical perspective, the impact of schooling on feelings of ethnic and religious 
identity is unclear. Modernization theory predicts education will reduce particularistic ethnic 
attachments and promote secularism. Yet other scholars argue that in pre-colonial times the most 
important groups were local “sub-ethnic” kinship groups, with ethnic boundaries fairly fluid 
(Shetler 2010) and thus see contemporary notions of tribal identity (among groups such as the 
Luhya in our sample) as essentially modern. In this second view, education could potentially 
promote political mobilization along ethnic lines, although recall from the background section 
that the Kenyan curriculum seeks to promote nationalism. The standard Kenyan school 
curriculum also includes Christian and Islamic religious education, and schools often sponsor 
religious youth groups, so education could also potentially strengthen, rather than weaken, 
religious attachment. 
We find no evidence that increased schooling weakened ethnic attachments, and if 
anything the program may have strengthened them.  In general, respondents were strongly 
attached to their own ethnic group, with only 11% of the control group not reporting ethnicity as 
“very important” to them. GSP treatment reduced this by 3.3 percentage points, or approximately 
30 percent, although the difference is not significant (Table 4, Panel A).  
 We next exploit the fact that ethnic identification is more salient closer to contested 
democratic elections in Africa (Eifert et al. 2010), likely because ethnic electoral appeals are 
widespread. We find that among the 43 respondents surveyed in early 2007 – a national election 
year – all but one stated that their ethnic affiliation was “very important” to them, far above the 
average among those surveyed earlier; this “censoring” of responses suggests that our survey 
instrument was insufficiently sensitive to finer distinctions in the degree of ethnic feeling during 21 
 
election periods. We next focus on respondents surveyed in 2005-2006, before the lead-up to the 
election, and find that treatment reduced the proportion who did not report ethnicity as “very 
important” by a significant 4.2 percentage points (s.e. 2.1, Table 4), a 40 percent drop. In other 
words, in non-election years the program appears to heighten feelings of ethnic identification. 
A related set of questions on ethnicity ask whether respondents trust members of their 
own ethnic group (tribe) as well as members of other groups. Point estimates suggest treatment 
slightly increased trust in co-ethnics and reduced trust in members of other ethnic groups, but the 
effects were not significant at traditional confidence levels (not shown). We similarly find no 
program impacts on migration out of the local area, which might have brought people into closer 
contact with other ethnic groups thus leading to more inclusive ethnic attitudes, and which might 
itself be taken as reflecting more inclusive attitudes (not shown). 
We also find no evidence for the modernization theory hypothesis that education leads to 
secularization as measured by changes in the reported importance of religion (Table 4, Panel A), 
although strong religiosity is nearly universal, complicating inference. There is more variation in 
participation in prayer groups, but there, too, impacts are small and not statistically significant.
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Impact on Democratic Attitudes 
Respondents were asked whether they agreed with a series of statements about the ideal 
organization of government and society, where responses were given on a scale from 1 to 5, 
ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”, and these were then normalized to range 
from zero to one, as above. To illustrate, respondents were asked whether they agreed with: “We 
should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections”, and 
“Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government”, among others. 
                                                 
11 Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) show that U.S. religious attendance rises with education. 22 
 
There are no significant GSP program impacts on any of the seven measures of 
democratic attitudes (Table 4, Panel B), and even combining all of these effects together in a 
single index, the mean effect is small and not statistically significant, at 0.058 standard 
deviations (s.e. 0.089). These results are particularly interesting in light of the positive cross-
sectional correlations between individual schooling and democratic attitudes documented in the 
existing literature, including several African studies (Bratton et al. 2005, Logan and Bratton 
2006, Mattes and Bratton 2007). While some have argued that investments in education may be 
an effective way to promote democracy and reduce political extremism, our results suggest that, 
if there is any such causal relationship, it may not be a direct one. 
Overall, we find no support for the hypothesis that education promotes “modern” 
attitudes including weakening of ethnic attachments, secularization, or greater belief in 
democracy. These findings partially alleviate concerns that more educated Kenyans are simply 
providing the “right” survey answers due to social desirability bias. In particular, to the extent 
that support for democratic institutions is the “politically correct” response in Kenya, we might 
have expected to find a strongly positive relationship between human capital and support for 
democracy, but we find no such relationship in our data.  We next examine whether education 
promotes empowerment in the political realm, consistent with the household autonomy results. 
 
5.2 Impact on Political Knowledge and Satisfaction 
The first hint that the program affected political outcomes is its impact on media consumption. 
Individuals in treatment schools report significantly less time listening to radio – which in Kenya 
has largely music and entertainment content – and more days reading newspapers, which report 
extensively on national politics (Table 5, Panel A). Respondents were also much more likely to 23 
 
identify a favorite newspaper, with an increase of 9.6 percentage points (s.e. 3.7) on a base of 
66.6% in the control, and in particular, there was a large increase of 10.5 points (s.e. 3.5) in 
choosing the Daily Nation, arguably Kenya’s most authoritative English language daily, as the 
favorite news source on a base of 30.5%. The increased affinity for the Daily Nation almost 
certainly in part reflects the treatment group’s improved English skills, but may also proxy for 
changing partisan or ideological tastes and affect the quality of political information consumed. 
Indeed, the program had a large impact on objective political knowledge. Respondents 
were asked to name Kenya’s President, Vice President, Education Minister, and Health Minister 
and Uganda’s President. Virtually all respondents could name the President, but the program 
increased the likelihood that respondents could name other officials, and the impacts are 
significant for naming the Health minister and the President of Uganda (not shown).  The mean 
effect across all five questions is 0.203 s.d. and significant at 95% confidence (Table 5, Panel B).  
Turning to measures of satisfaction with political authorities, the GSP treatment group 
shows less deference to authority in the abstract and expresses less satisfaction with Kenya’s 
government, economy, democracy, and current authorities (Table 5, Panel C).  In particular, 
respondents were significantly less likely to agree with the statement “We should show more 
respect for authority” and more likely to support the statement “As citizens, we should be more 
active in questioning the actions of our leaders”, with a change of 0.076 in the normalized index, 
relative to a control group mean of 0.53. When asked whether the quality of government and the 
economy were better than two years ago, treatment reduced positive assessments by 5.4 and 5.8 
percentage points, respectively, both significant at 90%.  This despite the fact that Kenya’s 
performance was good relative to historical benchmarks, with GDP growth of 6% in 2006-2007 
and reasonably democratic politics. In control schools, satisfaction with Kenyan democracy was 24 
 
0.74 (on a normalized 0 to 1 index), and treatment decreased this by 0.048 (s.e. 0.017). Taken 
together, expressed satisfaction falls in the treatment group by 0.239 standard deviations 
(significant at 99%). This sharp reduction in satisfaction with political authority parallels the 
rejection of male and parental authority in the household (Table 3). 
  There is no evidence that the program affected overall personal happiness, as captured by 
agreement with “taking everything together, the respondent is very happy” (Table 5, Panel C), 
and thus the political dissatisfaction questions do not simply reflect broader life dissatisfaction. 
Note that there is little consensus on the empirical relationship between education and happiness 
using OECD data (Frey and Stutzer 2002, Clark and Oswald 1996). 
 
5.3 Empowered for What? Perceived Political Efficacy, Participation, and Violence 
The increased knowledge and reduced satisfaction with authority generated by the program does 
not seem to translate into greater perceived political efficacy or more participation in politics or 
community affairs. Instead, there is increased acceptance of the use of violence in politics. 
Impact on Perceived Political Efficacy 
A large majority of respondents agreed with the statements “Politics and government sometimes 
seem so complicated that you can’t really understand what’s going on” and “This world is run by 
a few people in power, and there is not much that someone like me can do about it”, and GSP 
treatment does not lead to a significant change from the low levels of perceived political efficacy 
in the control group (Table 6, Panel A). Indeed, Kenyan politics at the time of the survey was 
characterized by Byzantine backroom deal-making among ethnically-based political leaders, 
many of whom were the sons of an earlier generation of leaders.  While treatment made the 25 
 
young women in the sample less satisfied with the political situation (Table 5), it apparently did 
not lead to any illusions about their personal ability to change the situation. 
 
Impact on Political and Community Participation 
The GSP did not increase interest or participation in politics or community affairs. In particular, 
26% of control group respondents reported being interested in public affairs, versus 23% in 
treatment, although this difference is not significant (Table 6, Panel A). Similarly, treatment 
respondents of voting age were slightly less likely to report intending to vote in the next 
presidential election (-2.6 percentage points, s.e. 4.5), but the effect is not significant. 
While some argue that education enhances civic participation (e.g., Glaeser et al. 2002), 
we do not find evidence for this. The survey gathered information on membership in 10 common 
types of community groups (women’s groups, credit groups, etc.), with average membership in 
1.41 groups in the control. There is no treatment effect on membership (Table 6, Panel B). The 
program also had no impact on trust, in the standard question “Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”. 
 
Attitudes Toward the Use of Violence in Politics 
Although Kenya has never experienced a civil war, it has a long record of ethnic violence around 
elections, going back to the first multi-party polls in 1992. As noted above, some observers have 
argued that education tends to reduce political violence while others see it as raising expectations 
that, if unmet, could increase individuals’ propensity towards violence (Davies 1974).  
We find that the GSP program led to greater expressed tolerance for political violence. 
Treatment individuals are significantly more likely to think violence is sometimes justified in 26 
 
politics (estimate 0.030, s.e. 0.012 in Table 6, panel C), off a base of 0.47 in the control group. It 
seems plausible that education increases acceptance of violence because it increases respondents’ 
political knowledge and reduces satisfaction with the status quo (as shown above), while 
apparently not simultaneously increasing their faith in their ability to achieve change through 
democratic means. Since they are no more committed to democratic values as a result of 
education and, if anything, more ethnically identified – the key dimension of social conflict in 
Kenya – it may not be surprising that education increases support for political violence. 
From one perspective, there appears to be a tension between the estimated impacts of 
education on views about the legitimacy of political violence and on domestic violence in our 
sample. However, both findings are consistent with the view that education reduces the knee-jerk 
acceptance of existing authorities, both at home and in the broader national political arena. 
 
6. Estimating the bi-directional relationship between schooling and attitudes 
As discussed in the introduction, some argue that education indoctrinates people to accept 
existing authority whereas others argue that it can empower people to challenge authority. Our 
results, taking advantage of experimental variation, provide considerable support for the 
hypothesis that education reduces willingness to accept authority.  In this section, we argue that 
out data are consistent with a bi-directional relationship between education and willingness to 
accept authority – in which those who are to accept authority are more likely to withdraw from 
education but education itself leads to questioning of authority – and that such a relationship 
could lead non-experimental analyses to understate the extent to which education leads to less 
acceptance of authority. 27 
 
  In Section 6.1 we present a simple model in which there is a bi-directional relationship 
between education and willingness to accept authority, and show that in this model standard 
approaches to estimate the impact of education on acceptance of authority using regressions in 
non-experimental data will yield biased estimates if – as is particularly plausible in schooling 
systems such as those of Kenya, which do not allow much room for student autonomy – those 
who are less willing to accept authority, are more likely to drop out of school. In section 6.2, we 
use the non-experimental variation in our data to estimate the extent of reverse causality, in 
which willingness to accept authority allows people to obtain more education, and the resulting 
bias that would be created in non-experimental estimates in our context. 
 
6.1 A Model of the Relationship between Schooling and Willingness to Accept Authority 
We consider a framework in which education can affect willingness to accept authority, and 
willingness to accept authority can affect schooling decisions. Suppose that: 
(eqn. 4)     R1 = R0 + γH, 
where R1 is the willingness to accept authority as an adult and R0 is willingness to accept 
authority as a child. H is a measure of human capital investment.  is thus the causal impact of 
education on willingness to accept authority. Suppose household i chooses human capital to trade 
off the benefits versus the net utility and financial cost of education: 
(eqn. 5)     Ui = B(Hi) – C(Hi). 
We assume that being in a school that has the merit scholarship program raises the benefit of 
human capital (B), because those who score well on the exam will receive financial benefits. We 
also assume that individuals may differ in the benefit of education, for example, due to 
differences in the non-pecuniary benefit of education or differences among children in aptitude 28 
 
or attitudes toward school. One component of this may be difference in willingness to accept 
authority, and we allow for the possibility that R0 may also affect the cost of education.   Recall 
that in our context, being in school requires acceptance of a great deal of authority, including 
acceptance of the right of teachers to impose work (such as cleaning the classroom or carrying 
items for the teachers), orders from student prefects, and corporal punishment.  Students who are 
unwilling to accept the fairly rigid discipline associated with Kenyan education often have to 
leave school, with perhaps the most notable example for non-Kenyans being Barack Obama Sr., 
who, despite his stellar grades, was expelled from an elite secondary school for what was 
deemed “disrespectful” behavior towards his teachers (Jacobs 2011). 
For simplicity, we take the benefits to be linear in the amount of education (H) and the 
cost of education to be quadratic in H.   Thus, we specialize to the case in which for household i: 
(eqn. 6)     Ui = Hi (B0,i+β1R0,i+β2Mi) – Hi
2, 
where R0,i indicates a child’s willingness to accept authority, Mi is an indicator for attending a 
merit scholarship program school, and B0 indicates an individual’s other benefits of education 
(per year of schooling).  We assume that child willingness to accept authority is distributed 
normally with mean   and variance   and that the benefits are distributed normally with 
mean   and variance  . These are distributed independently for simplicity (although this 
could easily be weakened). The optimal level of human capital investment for household i, Hi
* is 
determined by the first order condition:  
(eqn. 7)      
∗       ,        ,         2 ⁄ . 
This implies that, ceteris paribus, for each increase of one unit in a child’s willingness to accept 







It is straightforward to see that a regression of willingness to accept authority on 
education will not yield a causal estimate of the impact of education in this environment with 
bidirectional causality. In the case where there is no merit scholarship, an OLS regression of 
willingness to accept authority on human capital will yield the following coefficient (see the 
model appendix for the algebraic details): 
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  represents the bias in the OLS estimate, and from equation 8, we 
can see that the OLS estimator is biased upward, leading to an erroneous view that education 
leads to a more positive impact on the willingness to accept authority than is actually the case. 
Now consider the case in which a merit scholarship program is introduced in a randomly 
chosen subset of schools. By construction Mi is orthogonal to R0,i and B0,i. Using the merit 
scholarship as an instrument for human capital, Hi, would generate an unbiased estimates of the 
causal impact since merit scholarships are independent of initial willingness to accept authority 
and of other determinants of returns to education: 
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Taking the difference between the OLS and IV estimates allows us to solve for 1 in terms of 
known parameters (algebraic details are once again in the appendix):  
(eqn. 10)        1  
   
      
    
 
             
            
As shown in equation 10, we can solve for 1using estimates found in our data. 
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To empirically compare experimental and non-experimental results, the extent to which willingness to 
accept authority affects education, and the extent to which education affects acceptance of authority, 
we first reproduce the main reduced form impacts (from Tables 3-6) in column 1 of Table 7, then 
present IV estimates in column 2 and non-experimental OLS estimates (for the control group) in 
column 3. Column 4 presents p-values on the Hausman test of equality of the IV and OLS estimates. 
For the lack of autonomy index, the IV coefficient estimate implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in the normalized test score (in the 2005-2007 survey) is associated with an 
effect of -0.872 s.d. (s.e. 0.493), a large effect. To put this in context, a one standard deviation 
test score increase in this population is more than the gain observed (in the cross-section) by 
advancing by one primary school grade. This contrasts with a non-experimental OLS estimate of 
just -0.286, and thus the IV estimate is nearly three times as large as OLS. We reject equality of 
the experimental and non-experimental estimates at nearly 90% confidence (p-value=0.11). 
The IV estimate for the impact of education on satisfaction with authority index is large 
and negative (-1.115, s.e. 0.493) and significant at 95% confidence, while the OLS estimate is 
just -0.177, and the difference between the two is significant at 99% confidence. This divergence 
mirrors the findings above for the lack of autonomy index: both of these measures capture 
opposition to existing authorities, one in the home and the other in the broader political arena. 
The difference between the IV and OLS estimates is substantively large: while both have the 
same sign, the IV estimate is six times larger in magnitude and leads to different conclusions 
about the relationship between education and the willingness to accept authority. 
Under the model sketched above it is possible to solve for the impact of willingness to 
accept authority on education. Since both test scores and the satisfaction of authority index are 
normalized so that the variance is 1:  31 
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    .       .            1.115       	1.015.  Thus in 
equilibrium individuals who are 1 s.d. more willing to accept authority accumulate 1/2 or 0.507 
s.d. more human capital as measured by tests.  
This suggests that, all else equal, those pupils who are unwilling to accept authority are 
likely to invest less in education, consistent with a growing literature on the importance of 
individual personality traits as determinants of educational, labor market and other life outcomes 
(Heckman et al. 2006)  
In our data, an analysis that does not allow for the bi-directional effect or account for 
selection – namely, the OLS estimates in the control group – does not imply that education 
increases the willingness to accept authority (Table 7), but we argue that the magnitude of the 
effect of education in reducing acceptance of authority is biased greatly towards zero in this case.  
However, as can be seen from equation 8, the model suggests that in other environments where 
baseline variation in willingness to accept authority (  
 ) is greater, or other sources of variation 
in returns to education (  
 ) are smaller, the bias in non-experimental estimates would be greater, 
potentially leading to the erroneous conclusion that education increases willingness to accept 
authority. Perhaps one of the reasons that some scholars have believed that education promotes 
acceptance of authority is that they have simply compared individuals with different levels of 
education without taking selection into account. 
The above point estimate of the impact of willingness to accept authority on education is 
specific to the particular assumptions of the model, for example, to our specification of the 
functional form of the relationship between willingness to accept authority as a child and a 
young adult, and of the cost function for education. However, the findings that education reduces 
the willingness to accept authority by much more than would be thought based on regression 32 
 
analysis in non-experimental data; that the willingness to accept authority increases educational 
attainment; and that in situations with more baseline variation in willingness to accept authority a 
naïve cross-sectional analysis could lead to the “wrong sign”, namely the erroneous conclusion 
that education increases the willingness to accept authority, are all more general.  
Other differences in OLS and IV estimates are consistent with the model above. There is 
a significant difference in IV and OLS estimates of the impact of human capital on willingness to 
support political violence (p-value=0.02), where OLS estimates are again biased towards zero.    
There is no evidence that attitudes toward ethnicity, religion, or democracy affect 
education.  In particular, there are no statistically significant differences between the IV and OLS 
estimates for ethnic, religious, or democratic attitudes (with p-values of 0.11, 0.43, and 0.82, 
respectively), although note that the OLS relationship between human capital and democratic 
attitudes is significant at 99% confidence, consistent with many other observational studies 
discussed earlier.  The measures of newspaper reading and political knowledge are positive and 
significant in both the IV and OLS cases although IV estimates are larger in magnitude, and the 
difference between IV and OLS is significant at 90% for the political knowledge index. The 
perceived political efficacy index and the participation in politics index are near zero and not 
statistically significant for either the IV or OLS specifications, and there are no significant 
differences between them (with p-values of 0.31 and 0.56, respectively). 
Taken together, we reject the hypothesis that the IV and OLS estimates are equal for 
three of the ten dependent variables in Table 7 at 90% confidence (with two other p-values equal 
to 0.11), far more often than would be generated by chance alone under the null hypotheses that 
both were measuring the same underlying parameters. These large differences between non-
experimental and experimental estimates suggest that it is important to carefully distinguish 33 
 
treatment versus selection effects in assessing whether education instills greater willingness to 
accept authority, or changes in other political attitudes and behaviors, and point to the 
importance of research strategies that exploit experimental or quasi-experimental designs.   
 
7. Understanding the Channels of Impact 
One could entertain several hypotheses about the channels of impact. Beyond the leading 
explanation of a human capital effect, scholarship winners were also honored in a public 
ceremony that could have affected their self-image and confidence, and also received a cash 
prize. To distinguish between these effects, in this section we test whether subsamples who were 
very unlikely to win a scholarship also exhibited effects similar to those documented above. 
The main results are similar when we restrict attention to those individuals with baseline 
2000 test scores below +2 standard deviations (Table 8), suggesting that the findings are not 
being driven by scholarship winners, although note that standard errors do inevitably rise with 
the reduced sample size. We focus on our main outcome measures in this table. The lack of 
autonomy mean effect result is almost identical in this restricted subsample at -0.176 (s.e. 0.091). 
The satisfaction with authority mean effect is also similar (-0.147, s.e. 0.088), and we cannot 
reject that it is equal to the full sample estimate. As in the full sample, there are no significant 
impacts on “modern” ethnic, religious or democratic attitudes, nor on individuals’ perceived 
political efficacy or participation in civic affairs. The estimated program impact on measures of 
newspaper reading, political knowledge, and attitudes towards political violence remain positive 
but are somewhat smaller in magnitude and not significant in the restricted subsample.  When we 34 
 
examine estimates across the two samples (namely, all those with baseline test scores vs. those 
with scores less than +2 s.d.), in no case is the difference significant at even 90% confidence.
12 
Another hypothesis is that the impacts are due in part to school-wide changes in attitudes 
associated with the implementation of a scholarship program, if the experience of observing 
other girls being publicly recognized for their achievements changed norms. We cannot 
completely rule this out. However, there is no strong evidence in favor of this alternative view.. 
While one could perhaps tell a story where having a program that provided scholarships to girls 
led to more progressive gender attitudes (and thus could account for some of the autonomy 
findings in Table 3), it is harder to imagine why this would generate some of the other findings, 
for instance, in terms of newspaper reading, objective political knowledge, expressed satisfaction 
with political authority, or violence in politics. 
Moreover, it seems reasonable to conjecture that any school-wide effects of the program 
on gender attitudes would depend on the number of girls who were publicly recognized for their 
academic achievement. Because scholarships were awarded to girls scoring in the top 15% in the 
district and there is considerable school-to-school variation in test scores, there are large 
differences in the number of winners across schools (for instance, 16 of the 34 treatment schools 
had no winners in 2001). As above, we create a measure of predicted GSP winners in both 
treatment and control schools.  We find no compelling evidence of differences in the magnitude 
of program impacts across schools with different numbers of predicted winners (Table 9). In 
particular, the interaction terms between treatment and predicted winners are significant for just 
two of the ten outcomes, while for the other eight variables the t-statistic is less than one.  These 
                                                 
12 While impacts appear to be mostly driven by human capital, it is impossible to decompose this effect into the 
separate channels of primary school attendance (Table 1), secondary enrolment, and skills measured in tests (Table 
2), since we lack separate instruments for these channels. 35 
 
generally small and not significant estimates suggest that non-human capital channels are driving 
the results, although we cannot completely rule this out. 
 
8. Conclusion 
We examine the impact of increased human capital on political and social attitudes among young 
Kenyan women.  Our experimental results contribute to a vast and mostly non-experimental 
literature on the relationship between education and political and social attitudes, a relationship 
that is of particular interest in less developed societies like Kenya that have experienced rapid 
educational gains in recent decades. The program leads young women to reject the legitimacy of 
domestic violence and reduces their propensity to enter into marriages arranged by their parents. 
In findings that go against some claims in modernization theory, the program does not weaken 
ethnic attachment, promote secularization, or increase stated support for democracy.  
Consistent with the view that education can potentially enhance political consciousness 
and contrary to theories suggesting that education merely instills acceptance of existing 
authority, program participation leads to greater objective political knowledge and newspaper 
readership, less willingness to defer to authority, and reduced satisfaction with Kenya’s political 
and economic situation.  However, this does not translate into greater perceived political 
efficacy, higher rates of voting, or other forms of civic participation. This combination of 
heightened political awareness and reduced acceptance of the legitimacy of existing political 
structures, in an environment where respondents perceive little ability to effect change through 
Kenya’s nascent democratic institutions, may help explain why the increase in education was 
also associated with greater acceptance of the legitimacy of political violence. . 36 
 
One possible interpretation is that education allowed young Kenyans to hold more 
realistic views about their political system. As noted above, less than one year after our surveys 
were collected, Kenya held a national presidential election in which independent observers 
argued that the main opposition candidate – who received the vast majority of votes in our study 
area – won more votes but the incumbent claimed victory after vote rigging (Gibson and Long 
2009). After months of violent protests and bloody ethnic clashes a power-sharing deal was 
reached under which the incumbent remained president and the challenger became prime 
minister. As individuals in our sample received more education, their declining satisfaction with 
the status quo and growing acceptance of political violence arguably reflects their growing 
awareness of the role that violence often plays in Kenyan politics. 
Experimental and non-experimental estimates of the impact of education on acceptance 
of authority differ considerably, suggesting that observational cross-sectional correlations are 
biased. To make sense of these differences, we hypothesize that one’s ability to stay in school is 
closely related to her willingness to accept authority, which leads to omitted variable bias in non-
experimental estimates that could lead observers to erroneously conclude that education instills 
greater acceptance of authority.  In the context of a simple model, we assess the extent of reverse 
causality, which appears to be considerable. Somewhat ironically, it appears that only those who 
are sufficiently willing to accept a loss of autonomy when young (to succeed in school) actually 
have the opportunity to experience the gains in autonomy that education generates later in life. 
Estimating these causal effects of education is, we believe, a meaningful step towards 
understanding the positive cross-country empirical association between education and 
democracy. While interpretation of that relationship remains controversial, the results suggest 
that if education does lead societies to be more democratic, it is not necessarily through growing 37 
 
pro-democratic attitudes.  Rather the presence of an educated, well-informed and critical 
citizenry could lead democracies to function more successfully. Recent research argues that, 
regardless of individuals’ support for democracy per se, a necessary foundation for a successful 
democratic system is the existence of politically knowledgeable and engaged citizens willing to 
actively participate in political life and challenge political authorities (Moehler 2008; Glaeser et 
al. 2007). Alternatively, the higher levels of political dissatisfaction and tolerance of political 
violence generated by rising education could hasten the replacement of non-democratic regimes. 
As with all micro-studies conducted in a given context – here, among young Kenyan 
women – caution is requiring in generalizing the results to other populations, most notably for 
males and older adults, for whom we lack data.  Our results can be taken as relevant for rural 
Kenyan females at the margin of transitioning from primary schools – which are very much part 
of the fabric of village life – to secondary schools, which offer a much broader perspective of 
Kenya and the world. To what extent should we expect our results to generalize?  The effects of 
education could surely change as individuals’ age. It is impossible to know for certain without 
further work, but a natural conjecture is that the education of disadvantaged social groups – such 
as the rural women from politically marginalized ethnic groups in our sample – will induce 
greater awareness of politics, increase the desire for autonomy, and reduce tendencies to simply 
accept their powerlessness as a natural, immutable fact about the world. In our context, there is 
some indication that this translates into increased ethnic attachment and greater acceptance of the 
use of violence in politics. Yet it is plausible that in other contexts where there is greater scope 
for meaningful engagement in democratic politics, the heightened political consciousness and 
reduced acceptance of authority might instead lead to greater civic involvement, potentially 
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estimate (s.e.) on 
program indicator 
Panel A: Baseline characteristics (2001-2002 surveys)    
Student age (2001)  13.3 -0.14 
  (1.44) (0.15) 
Iron roof ownership  0.82 -0.048 
  (0.38) (0.038) 
Mother years of schooling  8.71 0.79
* 
  (4.18) (0.40) 
Father years of schooling  10.47 0.55 
  (3.99) (0.49) 
Proportion ethnic Luhya  0.79 0.067 
  (0.41) (0.056) 
Proportion ethnic Luo  0.104 -0.054 
  (0.31) (0.038) 
Proportion ethnic Teso  0.055 0.018 
  (0.23) (0.033) 
Test score pre-program, all subjects (normalized)  0.00 0.12 
  (1.00)  (0.20) 
Panel B: Short-run Impacts (2001-2002)    
Test score post-program, all subjects (normalized)  0.00 0.34
*
  (1.00) (0.20) 
Student school attendance  0.788 0.060
*
  (0.36) (0.032) 
Teacher school attendance  0.822 0.069
*** 
  (0.262) (0.025) 
    
Notes: Each row is from a separate OLS regression. Significant at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. The 
outcome variable is regressed on the GSP program (treatment) indicator. Standard errors are clustered by school. 
The sample size in Panel A ranges from 789 to 1387 observations depending on the dependent variable. The sample 
consists of female students in the Girls Scholarship Program schools in Busia who were interviewed in the long-run 
follow-up and will be included in subsequent analysis. The academic subjects tested included English, 
geography/history/civics, mathematics, science, and Swahili. The attendance data for both pupils and teachers was 
collected during unannounced visits to schools in 2001 and 2002. The sample size in Panel B is 993 students in the 
test score regressions, and 1351 students and 666 teachers in the attendance regressions, respectively. 
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estimate (s.e.) on 
program indicator 
Panel A: Sample attrition    
Surveyed in follow-up round (2005-2007)  0.816 -0.007 
  (0.388) (0.035) 
Panel B: Test Scores    
Arithmetic test (normalized)  0.00 0.135 
  (1.00) (0.102) 
English vocabulary test (normalized)  0.00 0.162
* 
  (1.00) (0.092) 
Raven’s matrix test (normalized)  0.00 0.182
** 
  (1.00) (0.075) 
Reading test (normalized)  0.00 0.124
* 
  (1.00) (0.071) 
Swahili vocabulary test (normalized)  0.00 0.218
** 
  (1.00) (0.088) 
Test score mean effect  0.00 0.208
** 
  (1.00) (0.092) 
Test score mean effect, among those with baseline scores < +2 s.d.  0.06 0.145
*
  (0.96) (0.082) 
Test score mean effect, among schools with 5 predicted GSP winners  -0.06  0.177
**
  (1.01) (0.081) 
Panel C: Schooling outcomes    
Attended at least some secondary school (0-1)  0.30 0.087
** 
  (0.46) (0.041) 
Still in school, at time of survey (0-1)  0.52 0.079
* 
  (0.50) (0.044) 
Grades of school completed  7.8 0.088 
  (1.2) (0.103) 
Notes: Each row is from a separate OLS regression. Significant at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. In 
Panels B-C the outcome variable is regressed on the GSP program (treatment) indicator, an indicator for student 
cohort, student age at time of the survey, the mean pre-program (2000) school test score, educational attainment of 
each parent, and timing of the follow-up survey (coefficient estimates not shown). There are no additional regression 
controls in Panel A. Standard errors are clustered by school. The sample size is 1,387 observations in Panels B-C. 
Details on the mean effect analysis are in the text. The test score mean effect in Panel B includes the arithmetic, 
English, Raven’s matrix, reading, and Swahili test results. 46 
 






estimate (s.e.) on 
program indicator 
“Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs and should remain so.” (0 to 1) 





    
“Men can beat their wives and children if they misbehave.” (0 to 1) 






    
Ever married (0-1)  0.21 -0.018 
  (0.41) (0.034) 
Ever married, with family involvement in spouse choice (0-1)  0.042  -0.024
* 
  (0.201) (0.013) 
Ever married, without family involvement in spouse choice (0-1)  0.165  0.005 
  (0.371) (0.031) 
Total fertility  0.400 -0.030 
  (0.764) (0.065) 
Lack of autonomy mean effect  0.00 -0.181
**
  (1.00) (0.077) 
Notes: Each row is from a separate OLS regression. Significant at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. The outcome variable is regressed on the GSP 
program (treatment) indicator, an indicator for student cohort, student age at time of the survey, the mean pre-program (2000) school test score, educational 
attainment of each parent, and timing of the follow-up survey (coefficient estimates not shown). Standard errors are clustered by school. The sample is N=1,387. 
Details on the mean effect analysis are in the text. The autonomy mean effect includes the two attitude questions and the “Ever married, with family involvement 
in spouse choice” variables. 
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estimate (s.e.) on 
program indicator 
Panel A: Ethnic and Religious Attitudes    
Ethnic identity is not “very important” to respondent (0-1)  0.110 -0.033 
  (0.313) (0.020) 





Migrated out of Busia and Teso districts  0.257 0.006 
  (0.437) (0.036) 
Religious identity is not “very important” to respondent (0-1)  0.014  0.005 
  (0.116) (0.006) 
Member of a prayer group (0-1)  0.371 0.018 
  (0.483) (0.034) 
Panel B: Democratic attitudes    




Agree with: “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government” (0 to 1) [AFB, WVS]  0.69  -0.005 
  (0.46) (0.035) 








Disagree with: "All decisions should be made by a council of elders." (0 to 1) [AFB]  0.27  0.023 
  (0.36) (0.026) 
Disagree with: "The military should come in to govern the country." (0 to 1) [AFB]  0.61  0.002 
  (0.41) (0.033) 




Democratic attitudes mean effect  0.00 0.058 
  (1.00) (0.089) 
Notes: Each row is from a separate OLS regression. Significant at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. The outcome variable is regressed on the GSP 
program (treatment) indicator, an indicator for student cohort, student age at time of the survey, the mean pre-program (2000) school test score, educational 
attainment of each parent, and timing of the follow-up survey (coefficient estimates not shown). Standard errors are clustered by school.  The sample is N=1,387, 
except in the restricted sample for ethnic identity, where only those interviewed in 2005 and 2006 are included, in which case N=1,346.  Details on the mean 
effect analysis are in the text. The mean effect at the bottom of Panel B includes all variables in that panel.    
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estimate (s.e.) on 
program indicator 
Panel A: Media Consumption    
Days listened to the radio in last week (0 to 7)  3.59  -0.642
*** 
  (2.87) (0.198) 
Days read a newspaper in last week (0 to 7)  0.439  0.134
* 
  (1.010) (0.074) 
Has a favorite newspaper  0.666 0.096
** 
  (0.472) (0.037) 
Favorite newspaper is the Daily Nation 0.305  0.105
*** 
  (0.461) (0.035) 
Panel B: Political Knowledge    
Political knowledge mean effect  0.00  0.203
** 
  (1.00) (0.085) 
Panel C: Satisfaction with Authority     
“We should show more respect for authority.” (0 to 1) 






Kenya’s quality of government is better than two years ago (0-1)  0.56  -0.054
* 
  (0.50) (0.031) 
Kenya’s economy is better than two years ago (0-1)  0.50  -0.058
* 
  (0.50) (0.033) 
Satisfaction with Kenyan democracy (0 to 1) [WVS]  0.74  -0.048
*** 
  (0.29) (0.017) 
Satisfaction with authority mean effect  0.00  -0.239
*** 
  (1.00) (0.061) 
Taking everything together, respondent is “very happy” (0-1) [WVS]  0.65   -0.027 
  (0.48) (0.039) 
Notes: Each row is from a separate OLS regression. Significant at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. The outcome variable is regressed on the GSP 
program (treatment) indicator, an indicator for student cohort, student age at time of the survey, the mean pre-program (2000) school test score, educational 
attainment of each parent, and timing of the follow-up survey (coefficient estimates not shown). Standard errors are clustered by school. The sample is N=1,387. 
Details on the mean effect analysis are in the text. The mean effect in Panel B includes variables “Knows Kenyan President’s name (0-1)”, “Knows Kenyan Vice 
President’s name (0-1)”, “Knows Kenyan Education Minister's name (0-1)”, “Knows Kenyan Health Minister's name (0-1)”, and “Knows Ugandan President's 
name (0-1)”; the mean effect in Panel C includes the four variables listed above the mean effect row.    
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Table 6: Perceived political efficacy, participation in politics and civic affairs, and attitudes towards violence in politics  






estimate (s.e.) on 
program indicator 
Panel A: Perceived Political Efficacy    
Disagree with: "Politics and government sometimes seem so complicated that you can’t really understand what’s going 





Disagree with: "This world is run by a few people in power, and there is not much that someone like me can do about it." 









Panel B: Participation in Politics and Civic Affairs     
Interested in public affairs (0-1) [AFB, WVS]  0.26 -0.028 
  (0.44) (0.028) 
Respondent intends to vote in the next presidential election (0-1)  0.48 -0.025 
  (0.50) (0.045) 
Community group memberships  1.41 0.059 
  (1.39) (0.105) 
Participation in politics and civic affairs mean effect  0.00 -0.038 
  (1.00) (0.073) 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with 





Panel C: Political Violence    
“It is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.” (0 to 1) 






    
Notes: Each row is from a separate OLS regression. Significant at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. The outcome variable is regressed on the GSP 
program (treatment) indicator, an indicator for student cohort, student age at time of the survey, the mean pre-program (2000) school test score, educational 
attainment of each parent, and timing of the follow-up survey (coefficient estimates not shown). Standard errors are clustered by school. The sample is N=1,387. 
Details on the mean effect analysis are in the text are in the text. The mean effect at the bottom of Panel A includes all variables in that panel, and the mean effect 
in Panel B includes all variables except for the trust question.   The sample size for the “intends to vote in the next presidential election” analysis falls to 963 
because the question was only asked of those respondents old enough to vote in the next election. The types of community groups include: women’s groups; 
farmer/agricultural groups; youth groups; water groups/well committees, credit, saving, or insurance groups; prayer or bible study groups; burial committees; 
school committees or clubs; sports teams; other community group.  
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Table 7: Comparing experimental and non-experimental estimates 
 
Coefficient 




(s.e.) on normalized 
test score (2005-07) 
IV-2SLS 
Coefficient estimate 
(s.e.) on normalized 
test score (2005-07) 
OLS 
Hausman test  
p-value, 
H0:ßIV=ßOLS 










Lack of autonomy index  -0.181
** -0.872
* -0.286
***  0.11 
  (0.077) (0.493)  (0.078)   





 (0.061)  (0.494)  (0.055)   
“It is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.” 











Ethnic identity is not “very important” (0-1) -0.033 -0.158  0.001  0.11 
  (0.020) (0.105)  (0.013)   
Religious identity is not “very important” (0-1) 0.005 0.023  -0.001 0.43 
  (0.006) (0.031)  (0.005)   
Democratic attitudes index  0.058  0.277  0.322
*** 0.82 
 (0.089)  (0.355)  (0.051)   




 (0.074)  (0.364)  (0.055)   





 (0.085)  (0.325)  (0.045)   
Perceived political efficacy index 0.055  0.265  -0.033  0.31 
 (0.066)  (0.346)  (0.050)   
Participation in politics and civic affairs index  -0.038  -0.183  0.017  0.56 
 (0.073)  (0.363)  (0.068)   
Notes: Each cell contains results from a separate regression. Significant at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Details on the mean effect analysis are in 
the text. Standard errors are clustered by school. The sample is N=1,387 for all dependent variables. 
In column 1, the outcome variable is regressed on the GSP program (treatment) indicator, an indicator for student cohort, student age at time of the survey, the 
mean pre-program (2000) school test score, educational attainment of each parent, and timing of the follow-up survey (coefficient estimates not shown). In 
column 2, the outcome variable is regressed on the same explanatory variables except the GSP program indicator is replaced by the normalized test score (in 
2005-2007) across all subjects, and the test score is instrumented by the GSP program indicator. In column 3, the normalized test score (in 2005-2007) across all 
subjects is included as an explanatory variable but it is not instrumented, and the sample is restricted to the control group (N=664). Column 4 presents the 
Hausman test results (p-value) on the hypothesis that the coefficient estimates are equal across columns 2 and 3 for each dependent variable. 
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Table 8: Comparing estimates in the full sample vs. among those with “low” baseline test scores 
 
Coefficient 




estimate (s.e.) on 
program indicator, 
baseline test score 
< +2 s.d. 
Test of equality of 
coefficient estimates 
in columns 1, 2 
 (p-value) 
Dependent variable:  (1)   (2)   (3) 
Lack of autonomy mean effect  -0.204
** -0.176
* 0.71 
  (0.088) (0.091)   
Ethnic identity is not “very important” (0-1) -0.024 -0.024  0.99 
  (0.024) (0.025)   
Religious identity is not “very important” (0-1) -0.007 -0.005  0.81 
  (0.007) (0.007)   
Democratic attitudes mean effect  -0.037  -0.062  0.78 
  (0.097) (0.096)   
Days read a newspaper in last week (0 to 7)  0.109 0.116 0.95 
  (0.097) (0.105)   
Political knowledge mean effect  0.109 0.107 0.90 
  (0.094) (0.097)   
Satisfaction with authority mean effect  -0.181
** -0.147  0.79 
  (0.089) (0.088)   
Perceived political efficacy mean effect  0.083  0.086  0.92 
  (0.077) (0.081)   
Participation in politics and civic affairs mean effect  -0.144  -0.138  0.95 
  (0.096) (0.098)   
“It is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.” (0 to 1)  






Notes: Each cell contains results from a separate regression. Significant at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Details on the mean effect analysis are in 
the text. Standard errors are clustered by school. The sample in column 1 consists of all individuals with baseline test score data (N=919). In column 2, the 
sample is restricted to individuals with baseline normalized test scores less than +2 s.d. (N=881).  
In columns 1 and 2, the outcome variable is regressed on the GSP program (treatment) indicator, an indicator for student cohort, student age at time of the survey, 
the mean pre-program (2000) school test score, educational attainment of each parent, and timing of the follow-up survey (coefficient estimates not shown). 
Column 3 presents the test results (p-value) on the hypothesis that the coefficient estimates are equal across columns 1 and 2 for each dependent variable. To 
carry out this test, 1000 draws (with replacement) of sample size 899 were taken from the full baseline test score sample, and the regressions analogous to 




Table 9: Effects in schools with different numbers of predicted GSP winners 
 
Coefficient 




(s.e.) on interaction 
between the program 
indicator and predicted 
number of winners 
Dependent variable:  (1)   (2) 
Lack of autonomy mean effect  -0.194
** 0.005 
  (0.096) (0.001) 
Ethnic identity is not “very important” (0-1) -0.039
** 0.005
** 
  (0.018) (0.002) 
Religious identity is not “very important” (0-1) -0.003 -0.0004 
  (0.007) (0.0006) 
Democratic attitudes mean effect  0.019  -0.004 
  (0.080) (0.010) 
Days read a newspaper in last week (0 to 7)  0.114 -0.004 
  (0.077) (0.007) 
Political knowledge mean effect  0.206
** 0.006 
  (0.036) (0.009) 
Satisfaction with authority mean effect  -0.205
*** -0.001 
  (0.063) (0.005) 
Perceived political efficacy mean effect  0.068  0.002 
  (0.069) (0.008) 
Participation in politics and civic affairs mean effect  -0.024  -0.008 
  (0.074) (0.009) 
“It is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.” (0 to 1)  







Notes: Each row contains results from a separate regression. Significant at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Details on the mean effect analysis are in 
the text. Standard errors are clustered by school. The sample is N=1,385 for all dependent variables. 
The outcome variable is regressed on the GSP program (treatment) indicator, the GSP indicator interacted with the predicted number of GSP winners, an 
indicator for student cohort, student age at time of the survey, the mean pre-program (2000) school test score, educational attainment of each parent, and timing 
of the follow-up survey (coefficient estimates not shown). The predicted number of GSP winners is estimated in treatment group schools by regressing the actual 
number of scholarship winners in the school on various quantiles of the baseline test score distribution for students in that school; the predicted number of 

































































































   
 
 
January 2001: Schools invited to participate, lists of students enrolled in grades 5 and 6 
in all program schools compiled (Nschools=69, Nstudents=3292) 
March 2001: Randomization of schools into treatment and control groups 





March 2001: Announcement of scholarship 
program in treatment schools;  
September and October 2001: Reminder 
meeting for parents 
Ongoing student and teacher attendance checks 
November 2002: Follow up achievement tests for cohort 2 (Nschools=69, Nstudents=892); 
winners announced and scholarship awards distributed 
 
2005-2007: Follow up individual surveys collected (Nstudents=1756, and 1387 with 
complete data matched to 2001 and 2002 data) 
November 2000: Baseline academic tests for cohorts 1 and 2 in Busia District taken 
May-July 2002: Background individual surveys collected for students in both cohorts 
 
November 2001: Follow-up achievement tests for cohort 1 (Nschools=69, Nstudents=1211); 
winners announced and scholarship awards distributed  
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Appendix B: Model appendix 
This appendix contains some of the algebra and analysis underlying the discussion of the model 
in section 7. Equation 7 implies that, in the absence of a merit scholarship program (as in our 
control group), the variance of education will be equal to: 
(eqn. A1)     . 
  
This implies that the willingness to accept authority for person i at time 1 will be: 
(eqn. A2)      ,      ,     
  ,      ,      
   . 
In the absence of a merit scholarship program, the variance of R1, (suppressing subscripts) is: 
 (eqn. A3)            ≡    
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In the absence of a merit scholarship program, the covariance between H
* and R1  will be: 
(eqn. A4)          , ∗  =            
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Taking the difference between equations 8 and 9 in section 7, allows us to estimate the bias, and 
solve for 1 in terms of known parameters: 


















This implies 1 is  
(eqn. A6)      1 




It is possible to solve for 1 based on observed parameters. To do so, we first rewrite equation 
A3 and then substitute the variance of R0into equation A6:  









11   
(eqn. A8)    1 







11   
To simplify let z 
















(eqn. A9)           1        
Solving for 1 yields: 









Re-writing yields equation 10 in the text. 
 